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Abstract
In a two-firm model where each firm sells a high-quality and a low-
quality version of a product, customers differ with respect to their
brand preferences and their attitudes towards quality. We show that
the standard result of quality-independent markups crucially depends
on the assumption that the customers’ valuation of quality is identical
across firms. Once we relax this assumption, competition across quali-
ties leads to second-degree price discrimination. We find that markups
on low-quality products are higher if consuming a low-quality product
involves a firm-specific disutility. Likewise, markups on high-quality
products are higher if consuming a high-quality product creates a firm-
specific surplus. For either case, we provide second-order approxima-
tions of the equilibrium prices.
JEL codes: D43, L13, L15
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1 Introduction
One of the common findings of the literature on horizontal and vertical mar-
ket segmentation are quality-independent markups: differences in costs are
translated one-to-one into differences in prices.1 This result stands in stark
contrast to observed empirical patterns.
For example, Barsky et al. (2003) use scanner data from one of the largest
Chicago area supermarket chains to estimate markup ratios between low-
quality “no-name” products and high-quality “national brands”.2 Consis-
tently across 19 product categories, they find higher markups on low-quality
products than on high-quality products, with estimated ratios ranging from
1.14 (for canned tuna) up to 2.33 (for toothbrushes). This result is mirrored
elsewhere, as in the study of Scott Morton and Zettelmeyer (2004) who gener-
ically find that retailers “can earn greater net profit[s] from selling the store
brands.”3
In other cases, markups on high-quality products are systematically higher.
For the automobile industry, Verboven (1999) provides empirical evidence
that premium products have larger absolute markups than base products.
Similarly, Barron, Taylor, and Umbeck (2000) estimate the average dealer
margin for premium gasoline to be almost 60 percent higher than the aver-
age margin for regular gasoline. For the hardware industry, Deltas, Stengos,
and Zacharias (2011) show that markups on flagship computers are substan-
tially higher than markups on slower and older machines.
These contrasting examples provide reason for the following conjecture:
When the firms’ high-quality products are identical, and their respective
lower-quality versions differ from each other (such as in retailing), markups
on low-quality products tend to be higher. On the other hand, when com-
petitors offer baseline products which are similar, but their premium versions
stand out from each other (such as in the automobile industry), high-quality
products are seemingly the better deal for firms.
In the present paper, we provide a theory which is in line with this pattern.
Contrary to existing theoretical work in this field, we do not assume that a
1For comprehensive surveys on the topic, see Armstrong (2006) and Stole (2007).
2More precisely, they compute lower bounds on these markup ratios, as marginal cost
is not observed.
3Analogous results appear, for instance, in Chintagunta, Bonfrer, and Song (2002) and
Bonfrer and Chintagunta (2004), where markups on store brands are higher than markups
on national brands in 17 of 18 categories. Regarding the music industry, Rabinovich,
Maltz, and Sinha (2008) show (among other things) that markups are lower on more
popular CDs.
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buyer’s difference in utility between consuming a high-quality product and a
low-quality product is constant across firms.4
Existing theories on the subject usually draw on the sequential revelation
of information in order to explain quality-related differences in markups.
Verboven (1999) and Ellison (2005), for instance, consider “add-on pricing
games” where only prices of low-quality products are publicly accessible. The
differences between low-quality and high-quality products are interpreted as
“add-ons”, which provide additional utility if consumed together with the
base good. Such a structure allows firms to sell add-ons at the monopoly
price, a result which follows from Diamond’s (1971) influential paper on
price adjustment under learning cost. This, in turn, explains higher mark-
ups on premium versions of a product. Such models are certainly relevant
concerning questions revolving around two-part tariffs, hidden costs, and the
like. In the above examples, however, it is hard to argue that there exists an
informational asymmetry between prices of high-quality products and prices
of low-quality products. We should, therefore, consider a static “standard
pricing game”.
Another strand of literature (Armstrong and Vickers, 2001; Rochet and
Stole, 2002; Yang and Ye, 2008) studies such “one-shot” models. Unfor-
tunately, for general specifications of demand and cost, these models can
only be solved numerically. Under similar assumptions as in the present
paper, however, closed-form solutions are available: In a symmetric equilib-
rium with fully covered markets, prices are cost-plus-fixed-fee, which implies
that markups are quality-independent. Verboven (1999), who considers a
discrete-choice version of this model, obtains the same result, which he calls
“somewhat surprising”. In the following, we argue that this finding is actually
the result of the fact that in all of these models, the firms basically play two
separate competition-on-a-line games à la Hotelling (1929).5 By considering
4Stole (1995), who separately analyzes horizontal and vertical second-degree price dif-
ferentiation in oligopolistic markets, states that “vertical preferences [. . . ] are harmonious
across firms – a customer with a high marginal valuation of quality for one firm will have
similar preferences for other firms as well; all firms prefer these customers.” While we agree
that quality enters utility in a monotonous fashion, we oppose the idea of “harmonious”
preferences. Marginal utility may differ from firm to firm.
5A notable exception is Bonatti (2011), who integrates brand-specific preferences in a
model of competitive market segmentation. In a similar way as Armstrong and Vickers
(2001), Rochet and Stole (2002), and Yang and Ye (2008), he allows firms to simultaneously
pick quality levels and prices. He obtains a “no distortion at the top” outcome. In the
present paper, we consider quality levels as given. This enhances the tractability of the
model. Accordingly, we can include horizontal differentiation and (more importantly)
explicitly approximate customer prices in the case of uniformly distributed preferences.
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alternative distributions of preferences, we investigate departures from this
outcome.
In our model, we also describe horizontal differentiation by use of the con-
ventional Hotelling framework. Our novelty concerns the characterization of
vertical preferences. We assume the disutility from consuming a low-quality
product rather than a high-quality product to be firm-specific.6 As an il-
lustration, consider the case of two retailing firms which both sell a popular
brand of a product as well as their respective “no-name” substitutes. The no-
name products may differ from the trademark brand in various dimensions,
many of which may be called “vertical”: technical sophistication, conditions
of production, product safety, quality of ingredients, ease of operation, eco-
friendliness, durability, and performance are just a few that come to mind.
Similarly, consumers are heterogenous as well: Whereas a “gourmet” pri-
marily cares about the sophistication of a meal, a “gourmand” puts more
emphasis on its size. In a nutshell, it is possible that the difference between
a customer’s willingness-to-pay for the two qualities varies from firm to firm;
but the sign and magnitude of this difference also varies among customers.
Taking the customers’ preferences as given, we look at two firms, each
selling a high-quality product and a low-quality product. If the customers’
preferences for quality are identical across the firms – an instance which we
consider as a special case – the firms essentially play two separate Hotelling
games: The disutility which a costumer incurs when buying the low-quality
product at firm A is the same as it would be at firm B. Thus, alongside the
vertical dimension, the firms are in a Bertrand-like situation. In this case,
horizontal differentiation remains as the single source of market power, and
equilibrium markups are unaffected by vertical preferences.
By contrast, if the customers’ vertical preferences are firm-specific, a fun-
damental asymmetry comes into play: On the one hand, a customer who
buys the high-quality product has a constant willingness to pay, regardless
of whether his or her vertical disutility (which would be incurred by consum-
ing the low-quality product) assumes a low or a high value. On the other
hand, a customer who buys the low-quality product has a higher willingness
to pay the less the qualitative difference between the two varieties affects
his or her utility. That is, the lower the realization of the vertical disutil-
ity at firm A, the likelier it becomes that even a B-affine customer starts
6Instead of a firm-specific disutility, we could think of an additional utility which arises
from consuming high-quality products. Think of the airline industry, where economy-class
compartments are similar across many carriers. Regarding the business class or the first
class, one airline focusses on wider seats, whereas another airline serves better food or
offers a more up-to-date entertainment system. As we show in the final section of this
paper, such a setting tends to induce higher markups on high-quality products.
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buying the low-quality product at A. Thus, metaphorically speaking, we
show that both firms are able to catch low-quality customers out of their
competitor’s pond. Accordingly, each firm’s low-quality-product customer
base becomes to some extent inflated. Usual marginal-versus-infra-marginal-
consumers considerations then imply that the firms set higher prices for their
lower-quality products.
We organize the rest of the article as follows. In Section 2 we set up a
model of spatial competition with two exogenously given qualities. We allow
for general distributions, including firm-dependent vertical preferences. As
we show in Section 3, the equilibrium relation between markups and quality
depends on the distribution of customers. This contrasts with the earlier con-
tributions, but is too general as a result to gain additional insights. Therefore,
in the following sections we look at prototypical cases where the customers’
taste parameters are uniformly distributed. In Section 4, we impose the stan-
dard assumption of perfectly correlated vertical preferences. This leads to
quality-independent markups. In Section 5, we put this result into perspec-
tive by looking at independently and identically distributed taste parameters.
In the case of homogenous high-quality products (abstracting form horizontal
preferences), we find higher markups on low-quality products. This result is
reversed once we assume that low-quality products are vertically the same,
and additional benefits from consuming high-quality products are specific to
the firm, as we exemplify in Section 6. Section 7 concludes. Parts of the
proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2 Model
Following the standard procedure in the literature, we consider a Hotelling
model of horizontal differentiation which we augment by a vertical compo-
nent. Two profit-maximizing firms, A and B, both offer a low-quality product
L and a high-quality product H.7 For each firm i ∈ {A,B}, we denote i’s
prices for L and H by piL and piH . The constant marginal cost of production
is cL for L and cH for H. Thus it is the same across firms but generally varies
with quality. It is natural to assume that cH ≥ cL ≥ 0.
There is a continuous unit mass of consumers, each of which is described
by a triplet d = (d, dAL , dBL ) ∈ [0, 1]3. d is the conventional (horizontal) taste
parameter, whereas diL reflects the reduction of a consumer’s willingness to
pay if he or she buys L instead of H at i. For the moment, we leave it open
7In the following, everything which holds for A automatically translates to B, as we
assume the firms to be symmetric.
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whether dAL = dBL or not. Each consumer buys only one product at only one
firm. If opting for firm i, the utility of consumer d is
ui(d) =
v − piH − tdi if qiH = 1v − piL − tdi − tLdiL if qiL = 1, (1)
where di = d if i = A and di = 1 − d if i = B. t and tL are weighting
parameters which measure the relative importance of the horizontal and ver-
tical differentiation.8 We assume v, the base utility of both versions of the
product, to be sufficiently high, such that each consumer ends up buying
either L or H. Accordingly, we do not have to make any assumptions on
a consumer’s reservation value. Furthermore, we impose cH − cL ≤ tL, an
assumption which ensures interior equilibria.
Based on (1), we can subdivide the decision of an individual consumer
into two parts. First, the consumer chooses firm A if and only if
v −min{pAH , pAL + tLdAL} − td ≥ v −min{pBH , pBL + tLdBL} − t(1− d). (2)
Given condition (2), the consumer prefers L over H if and only if
pAL + tLdAL ≤ pAH . (3)
In analyzing the model, we will look at symmetric subgame-perfect Nash-
equilibria for the “pricing game” where each firm i chooses prices piL and piH
and consumers subsequently buy their preferred product. These equilibria
may or may not involve the selling of both qualities. However, whenever firm
i sells both L and H in a (putative) equilibrium, we know from (3) that
0 ≤ xi := (piH − piL)/tL < 1. (4)
That is, by defining xi as the threshold value above which diL must lie in order
to buy H at i, we know that xi is located between 0 and 1 in an interior
equilibrium.
In the following sections, the structure of the firms’ objective functions is
generally subject to the relation between prices. Therefore, as long as a firm
chooses to remain within an interior symmetric equilibrium, we impose (4)
(as well as symmetric prices) in order to construct a firm’s objective function.
It is clear, however, that these relations can never be used strategically: each
firm optimizes with respect to its own prices only.
8Hence horizontal preferences are continuously distributed in the compact set [0, t], and
vertical preferences are continuously distributed in the compact set [0, tL].
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In Section 3, we derive optimality conditions for arbitrary distributions of
(d, dAL , dBL ) and show that, in general symmetric interior equilibria, markups
on H and L are not the same but depend on the particular distribution. To
illustrate this, Section 4 and Section 5 compare the outcomes of the pricing
game for two specific distributions of the consumers’ preferences.
In Section 4, we assume that dAL = dBL =: dL, and (d, dL) ∼ i.i.d. U2[0, 1].
Such a specification is analogous to Verboven (1999), Armstrong and Vickers
(2001), and Rochet and Stole (2002), and describes the case where consumers
perceive the difference between L and H to the same extent at both firms.
By contrast, in Section 5 we assume that d ∼ i.i.d. U3[0, 1]. There,
vertical preferences with respect to the two firms are completely uncorrelated.
It might be that at firm A a consumer barely notices any difference between
L and H, whereas at firm B the willingness to pay is much higher for H than
for L.
3 General Demand Function:
Differing Markups on H and L
Before examining the competing firms’ equilibrium behavior, we need to
determine their demand as a function of all prices.
Demand Function QAH , firm A’s total demand for product H, is the (ex-
ante) probability that a consumer prefers to buy H at A to buying H or L
at B or L at A. Using (1), we have
QAH = P [qAH = 1] = P
[
pAH + td ≤ pBH + t(1− d)︸ ︷︷ ︸
d≤HH
∩ pAH + td ≤ pBL + t(1− d) + tLdBL︸ ︷︷ ︸
d≤HL
(5)
∩ pAH + td < pAL + td+ tLdAL
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
dAL>x
A
.
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In (5), XAXB refers to the “switching line”, below which a consumer’s value
of d must lie such that he or she prefers to buy XA ∈ {L,H} at A as
compared to buying XB ∈ {L,H} at B. As defined in (4), xA is the critical
value of dAL above which a consumer prefers to buy H at A instead of L at
A. Analogically, we write QAL as
QAL = P [qAL = 1] = P
[
pAL + td+ tLdAL ≤ pBH + t(1− d)︸ ︷︷ ︸
d≤LH
∩ pAL + td+ tLdAL ≤ pBL + t(1− d) + tLdBL︸ ︷︷ ︸
d≤LL
(6)
∩ pAL + td+ tLdAL ≤ pAH + td
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
dAL≤xA
.
After solving the first two inequalities in (5) for d, we write the conditional
joint probability of d ≤ HH and d ≤ HL as
P
[
d ≤ HH ∩ d ≤ HL|dAL , dBL
]
=
∫ min{HH,HL}
0
f(d|dAL , dBL )dd. (7)
For this equality to be true, we need min{HH,HL} ∈ [0, 1]. In an interior
symmetric equilibrium, this condition holds by symmetry and condition (4),
provided 0 ≤ (pAH − pBL )/t ≤ 1.9 That is, prices need to be sufficiently close;
and therefore, for each combination of dAL and dBL , there are both consumers
with small values of d who buy H at A and consumers with large values
of d who buy any of the products at B. By incorporating the remaining
inequality in (5), dAL > xA, into (7), we obtain
QAH =
∫ 1
0
(∫ 1
xA
(∫ min{HH,HL}
0
f(d, dAL , dBL )dd
)
ddAL
)
ddBL . (8)
In the upper part of Figure 1, we graphically represent QAH , the region where
d ≤ HH, d ≤ HL, and dAL > xA. For given prices pAH and pAL , with pAH > pAL ,
consumers buy H at A if their value of d is low and their value of dAL is high.
Furthermore, in order for a consumer to buy H, dBL must not be too small.
9In Section 4, this additional condition is redundant, as dAL = dBL is sufficient for
min{HH,HL} ∈ [0, 1] and min{LH,LL} ∈ [0, 1]. In Section 5, we first assume the
validity of the condition, and subsequently prove that pAH − pBL > t cannot hold in any
symmetric interior equilibrium.
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d
dAL
dBLxA = p
A
H −pAL
tL
1
2 +
pBL −pAH
2t
1
2 +
pBL −pAL
2t
1
2 +
pBH −pAL
2t
xB = p
B
H −pBL
tL
tL
2t
tL
2t
Ā
Figure 1: Consumers who buy A’s high-quality product, QAH , are displayed
in the upper region, where dAL > xA. Consumers who buy A’s low-quality
product, QAL , are displayed in the lower region, where dAL ≤ xA.
The derivation of QAL is analogous to the derivation of QAH . Consumers
buy L at A if this is more favorable than either buying any of H or L at B
or buying H at A. Using (6), we obtain
QAL =
∫ 1
0
(∫ xA
0
(∫ min{LH,LL}
0
f(d, dAL , dBL )dd
)
ddAL
)
ddBL . (9)
In the lower part of Figure 1, we graphically represent QAL , the region where
d ≤ LH, d ≤ LL, and dAL ≤ xA. By comparing QAH and QAL , the following
asymmetry stands out. Regarding d, the support of QAH is independent of
dAL , whereas the support of QAL increases for a decreasing dAL . In other words,
regarding consumers of L, the utility is generally higher the lower dAL is. On
the other hand, consumers of H all obtain the same level of utility, once we
abstract from d. As it later turns out, this asymmetry plays a crucial role
for the determination of markups whenever we assume that a change in dAL
not necessarily implies a change in dBL .
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Equilibrium In the following, we first determine the prices and profits
which occur in symmetric interior equilibria. Later, for each distribution of
d which we analyze, we also check whether firms have incentives to deviate to
corner solutions, i.e., by only selling L or H. Furthermore, we demonstrate
that symmetric corner solutions cannot constitute equilibria in each of the
considered cases.
In an interior equilibrium, firm A maximizes
πA = QAH(pAH − cH) +QAL(pAL − cL), (10)
with QAH and QAL defined in (8) and (9). Since the integrands in QAH and QAL
are continuous functions in pAH and pAL , (10) is differentiable, and the first-
order conditions (FOCs) with respect to pAH and pAL are necessarily satisfied
in an interior equilibrium. As we show in Appendix A.1, after imposing
pAH = pBH =: pH and pAL = pBL =: pL (and thus xA = xB =: x), we can express
the FOC with respect to pAH as(∫ 1
0
∫ 1
x
mHddALddBL +
∫ 1
0
AH(dAL = x)
tL
ddBL
)
(pH − cH)
=
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
x
AHddALddBL︸ ︷︷ ︸
=QAH
+
∫ 1
0
AH(dAL = x)
tL
ddBL (pL − cL), (11)
where AH and mH are defined as follows.
AH :=
∫ min{HH,HL}
0
f(d)dd
denotes the amount of H-consumers at A for given values of dAL and dBL , and
mH := (1/2t)f(min{HH,HL}, dAL , dBL )
is the “margin” of AH , that is, the subset of AH which leaves firm A towards
firm B after a marginal increase of pAH .
How can we interpret equation (11)? Of course, in an interior optimum,
the marginal benefits of increasing pAH equal the marginal costs. The left-hand
side of (11) displays the latter: The first term, where dAL > x, relates to A’s
H-consumers which leave A towards B if A raises pAH . By doing so, the firm
looses pH − cH on each of these consumers. It also looses the same markup
on consumers who stay at A but start to buy L instead of H. The measure
of these intra-firm migrants is Ā/tL, where Ā :=
∫ 1
0 A
H(dAL = x)ddBL is shown
in Figure 1. The same consumers, however, are also part of the marginal
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benefit of increasing pAH , which we display on the right-hand side of (11). On
each such consumer, A gains pL− cL, the markup on L. The remaining part
of the marginal benefit is QAH , which refers to the infra-marginal consumers
on whom A benefits by increasing pAH .
Analogically, and also in Appendix A.1, we simplify the symmetric-version
FOC with respect to pAL as(∫ 1
0
∫ x
0
mLddALddBL +
∫ 1
0
AL(dAL = x)
tL
ddBL
)
(pL − cL)
=
∫ 1
0
∫ x
0
ALddALddBL︸ ︷︷ ︸
=QAL
+
∫ 1
0
AL(dAL = x)
tL
ddBL (pH − cH), (12)
where AL :=
∫min{LH,LL}
0 f(d)dd, and mL := (1/2t)f(min{LH,LL}, dAL , dBL )
are similarly interpreted as AH and mH . In Appendix A.1, we show that
AL(dAL = x) = AH(dAL = x). That is, marginal consumers within firm A are
the same for changes in pAH and changes in pAL . We highlight these consumers
by Ā in Figure 1.
Beyond that, equation (12) again displays two considerations. First, we
have the conventional tradeoff between gains on infra-marginal consumers
and losses on marginal consumers who leave the firm. Second, regarding
Ā/tL, the FOC displays an instance of “intra-firm competition” between H
at A and L at A.
Before heading to applications of what we established so far, we state
Proposition 1, which sheds some new light on the results of Verboven (1999),
Armstrong and Vickers (2001), and Rochet and Stole (2002).
Proposition 1. Suppose there is a symmetric interior equilibrium of the
pricing game, where pH − pL ≤ t. Then the firms’ markups on H and L are
generally different.
Proof. Note that min{HH,HL} = HH if and only if dBL > x. Analogically,
min{LH,LL} = LH if and only if dBL > x. Next, suppose that markups on
H and L were identical. DefineM = pH−cH = pL−cL. In this case, adding
up equations (11) and (12) yields
1
2t
(∫ x
0
(∫ x
0
f(LL, dAL , dBL )ddBL +
∫ 1
x
f(LH, dAL , dBL )ddBL
)
ddAL
+
∫ 1
x
(∫ x
0
f(HL, dAL , dBL )ddBL +
∫ 1
x
f(HH, dAL , dBL )ddBL
)
ddAL
)
M
= QAL +QAH = 1/2,
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where the second equality is based on the symmetry condition.
We see that, in general, markups on H and L are not identical: Even
though a variation in the distribution of either dAL or dBL could be absorbed
by a change ofM (it necessarily holds that x = (cH−cL)/2), this is generally
not possible for a change in both of these distributions.
As a corollary, Proposition 1 implies that, if f(d) is constant (and there-
fore equals 1) and there are identical markups on H and L, these markups
areM = t. More importantly, the same applies if
f(d) =
1 if dAL = dBL ,0 otherwise, (13)
which is the standard case in the literature.
In Section 4, we show that markups are indeed identical (and therefore
equalM) in this standard case, and that symmetric equilibria usually exist
and are interior. Thereupon, in Sections 5 and 6, we discuss counterexamples
where markups on H and L differ.
4 The Benchmark:
Correlated Vertical Preferences
Here we consider the case where each consumer perceives the quality differ-
ence between L and H to the same extent at both firms. We show that, from
a firm’s point of view, the presence of a second (vertically differentiated)
product is inconsequential, as compared to the standard Hotelling case.
Demand Function Specifically, we assume that dAL = dBL =: dL, and
(d, dL) ∼ i.i.d. U2[0, 1]. The difference in utility between consuming H and
L is the same at both firms. In this case, equations (8) and (9) simplify to
QAH =
∫ 1
xA
(∫ min{HH,HL}
0
dd
)
ddL, and QAL =
∫ xA
0
(∫ min{LH,LL}
0
dd
)
ddL.
We show graphical representations of QAH and QAL in Figures 2 and 3, re-
spectively, which can be considered as cross-sections of Figure 1 for which
dAL = dBL .
In Figure 2, each of three shaded areas represents consumers who prefer to
buy H at A as compared buying either H at B (d ≤ HH), L at B (d ≤ HL)
or L at A (dAL > xA). The intersection of these areas is QAH . In a symmetric
12
d = dL = 0
xA = p
A
H −pAL
tL
dL = 1
d = 11
2 +
pBL −pAH
2t
1
2 +
pBH −pAH
2t
2t
tL
Ā = 1/2
Figure 2: The fraction of consumers which buy firm A’s high-quality product,
QAH , is given by the intersection of the three shaded areas.
equilibrium, d ≤ HL, which is bordered by the upward-sloping line, never
binds: Whenever a consumer prefers buying H at A over buying L at A and
H at B, it follows from symmetric prices and dAL = dBL that this consumer
also prefers buying H at A over buying L at B. In other words, there is no
direct “inter-firm” competition between H and L.
In Figure 3, we represent QAL . Here, the downward-sloping line borders
d ≤ LH, a condition which also never binds, for exactly the same reason.
Equilibrium and Welfare In order determine prices and profits of a sym-
metric interior equilibrium, we start with the FOCs (11) and (12), which hold
in a symmetric interior equilibrium. Thereupon, we show that firms do not
have incentives to deviate to a corner solution, that is, by only selling L or
H. Furthermore, we show that, in general, a symmetric corner solution is
not an equilibrium either.
By applying (13) to (11) and (12), we write the symmetric-version FOCs
with respect to pAH and pAL as(1− x
2t +
1
2tL
)
(pH − cH) =
1− x
2 +
1
2tL
(pL − cL), (14)
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d = dL = 0
xA = p
A
H −pAL
tL
dL = 1
d = 11
2 +
pBL −pAL
2t
1
2 +
pBH −pAL
2t
2t
tL
Ā = 1/2
Figure 3: The fraction of consumers which buy firm A’s low-quality product,
QAH , is given by the intersection of the three shaded areas.
and (
x
2t +
1
2tL
)
(pL − cL) =
x
2 +
1
2tL
(pH − cH). (15)
Before discussing equations (14) and (15), we use them to establish Lemma
1.
Lemma 1. If dAL = dBL = dL, and (d, dL) ∼ i.i.d. U2[0, 1], symmetric interior
equilibria of the pricing game are characterized by p∗H = cH + t and p∗L =
cL + t.
Proof. Note that x(p∗H , p∗L) = (cH − cL)/tL and (p∗H , p∗L) solves (14) and (15).
In the opposite direction, assume to the contrary that pH − cH > pL − cL.
If this is the case, (14) implies that pH − cH < t, while (15) implies that
pL − cL > t. Therefore, pL − cL > t > pH − cH , which contradicts pH −
cH < pL − cL. Since pH − cH < pL − cL yields a similar contradiction, it
must hold that pH − cH = pL − cL =: M. Formulated this way, (14) reads
(1−x)/2t×M = (1−x)/2, orM = pH−cH = pL−cL = t. In Appendix A.2,
we show that there are no unilateral deviations towards corner solutions.
How can we interpret Lemma 1? In the symmetric equilibrium, each firm
serves half the customer base, a fraction x of which buys L and a fraction
14
1−x buys H. Markups on H and L are identically equal to t, and profits are
π(p∗H , p∗L) = t/2. The left-hand side of equation (14) displays the marginal
cost of increasing pAH : (1 − x)/2t consumers (A’s H-consumers) leave A to-
wards B; and 1/2tL consumers change the product but not the firm. The
right-hand side of (14) shows the marginal benefit of increasing pAH : (1−x)/2
relates to A’s infra-marginal consumers; and 1/2tL start buying L instead of
H at A. The interpretation of (15) is analogous. Thus, from identical mark-
ups onH and L, there is no need for A to care about customers who stay with
A but only swap qualities. It solely remains to trade off between the marginal
cost from consumers who leave A and the marginal benefit on infra-marginal
ones. That is, regarding H, A and B play a standard Hotelling game with
respect to these consumers for whom dL > x = (cH−cL)/tL. Concerning con-
sumers with dL ≤ x, A and B play a Hotelling game regarding L. As we have
seen earlier, in a symmetric equilibrium, A’s version of H does not directly
compete with B’s version of L. That is, by marginally raising pAH , A affects
the composition of its own customer base, and A looses some consumers who
start buying H at B. From dAL = dBL , however, there is no first-order effect
concerning consumers who both change the firm and the product. In Section
5, we drop the assumption of correlated vertical preferences. There, both
H and L of B will pose a threat if A increases pAH or pAL . The alternative
assumption dAL⊥dBL will crucially change the result of Lemma 1.
Before concluding this section with a more general statement which takes
into account the possibility of corner solutions, we compare the market out-
come with first-best efficient allocations. In the present case, maximizing a
utilitarian welfare function is equivalent to minimizing the sum of the firms’
production cost and the consumers’ disutility from both horizontal and ver-
tical distance to the product which is actually bought. If and only if it is
efficient that consumer d̄ buys L at A, it is efficient that consumers with
lower values of d and dL also buy L at A. Likewise, if and only if it is ef-
ficient that d̄ buys H at A, it is efficient that consumers with lower values
of d and higher values of dL also buy H at A. Hence, in order to determine
a socially efficient allocation, it is sufficient to find cutoff values d̄∗ and d̄∗L
which minimize
W (d̄, d̄L) =
∫ d̄
0
(∫ d̄L
0
cL + td+ tLdLddL +
∫ 1
d̄L
cH + tdddL
)
dd
+
∫ 1
d̄
(∫ d̄L
0
cL + t(1− d) + tLdLddL +
∫ 1
d̄L
cH + t(1− d)ddL
)
dd.
The FOCs ofW (d̄, d̄L) with respect to d̄ and d̄L yield d̄∗ = 1/2 and d̄∗L = (cH−
cL)/tL. These cutoff levels comply with the market solutions described in the
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following proposition. Market allocations are efficient because, abstracting
from horizontal preferences, dAL = dBL implies that firms are in a Bertrand
situation, which in turn leads to first-best efficiency.
Before relaxing dAL = dBL , we summarize the main findings of this section
in Proposition 2. We present the remaining parts of the proof in Appendix
A.3.
Proposition 2. If dAL = dBL = dL, and (d, dL) ∼ i.i.d. U2[0, 1], symmetric
equilibria of the pricing game are characterized by p∗H = cH+t and p∗L = cL+t.
Consumers with d ≤ 1/2 (d > 1/2) buy at firm A (B). Consumers with
dL > (cH − cL)/tL (dL ≤ (cH − cL)/tL) buy H (L). Each firm’s equilibrium
profit is π(p∗H , p∗L) = t/2, and the market outcome is efficient.
5 Uncorrelated Vertical Preferences (I):
Markups on L May Be Higher
Here we consider the case where the consumer-specific perception of the
quality difference between H and L depends on the firm. We show that,
in contrast to the outcome of Section 4, the markup on L is higher than
the markup on H, equilibrium profits increase, and the market outcome is
inefficient.
Demand Function From d ∼ i.i.d. U3[0, 1], we use the definitions in (8)
and (9) with f(d) ≡ 1 to describe QAH and QAL . The difference in utility
between consuming H and L is now specific to the firm. For a graphical
representation of QAH and QAL , recall Figure 1 in Section 3. There, we hinted
at a fundamental asymmetry between QAH and QAL , which we study now in
greater detail.
Abstracting from the horizontal characteristic d, consumers with high
values of dAL (which buy H at A) all obtain the same utility, which equals the
utility of consumers who are indifferent between buying L andH. To see this,
consider Figure 4, which reproduces Figure 1 and augments it by QBH and QBL
(as they are allocated in a symmetric interior equilibrium). Consumer dLH
is indifferent between buying at A and buying at B, but also between buying
L at A and buying H at A. Consumers with higher values of dAL , such as
consumer dH, are indifferent between the firms, but prefer buying product H
once they opt for firm A. The only difference between dLH and dH concerns
the realization of dAL . For a H-consumer, however, dAL is irrelevant, as it
only affects the utility of L-consumers. For these, the lower the value of dAL ,
the higher is the utility obtained from buying L. Therefore, consumers who
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d
dAL
dBLx
1/2
x
tL
2t
tL
2t
dLH
dH
dL
Figure 4: In a symmetric interior equilibrium allocation, consumers with high
values of dAL and low values of d buy H at A; consumers with low values of
dAL and low values of d buy L at A; consumers with high values of dBL and
high values of d buy H at B; and consumers with low values of dBL and high
values of d buy L at B.
resemble dLH, but exhibit lower values of dAL , are strictly better off than dLH
(by buying L at H). Consequentially, even consumers with higher values of
d, such as dL, are equally well off as dLH.
Naturally, we can replicate this thought experiment for each consumer
who is indifferent between either of the product versions at A. As we see in
Figure 4, this results in an inflated quantity QAL . More precisely, the ratio
between A’s infra-marginal L-consumers and A’s marginal L-consumers (on
the boundary towards B) exceeds the same ratio with respect to A’s H-
consumers. This, in turn, provides an incentive for A to raise pAL .
Equilibrium and Welfare As in Section 4, we start with the FOCs (11)
and (12), which apply in a symmetric interior equilibrium. Thereupon, we
show once more that firms do not have incentives to deviate to a corner
solution, and we demonstrate that, in general, a symmetric corner solution
is not an equilibrium either.
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After imposing f(d) ≡ 1 on (11) and (12), we write the symmetric-version
FOCs with respect to pAH and pAL as(
1− x
2t +
Ā
tL
)
(pH − cH) = (1− x)Ā+
Ā
tL
(pL − cL), (16)
and (
x
2t +
Ā
tL
)
(pL − cL) = x
(
Ā+ pH − pL4t
)
+ Ā
tL
(pH − cH), (17)
where Ā := 1/2− (tL/4t)x2 represents the frontier between consumers of H
and consumers of L at A (see Figure 1).
Equations (16) and (17) help us understand the firms’ equilibrium behav-
ior. The left-hand side of (16) displays the marginal cost of increasing pAH :
A share of A’s customers who are indifferent between the two firms, namely
the fraction 1 − x which buys H at A, leaves A towards B; an additional
fraction Ā/tL moves inside the firm to buy L. On both of these groups, A
loses pH − cH per customer. Regarding the customers which move within A,
however, the marginal loss is offset by a marginal profit of pL− cL on L. We
see this on the right-hand side of (16), alongside with (1− x)Ā, A’s existing
consumers of H, on whom A increases its profit by increasing pAH .
The interpretation of (17) is similar. An increase of pAL leads to a per-
customer loss of pL − cL on L, both on consumers leaving A towards B
(x) and on the ones moving internally (Ā/tL). Again, part of this loss is
retained by a gain on H. The marginal profit on infra-marginal consumers,
however, looks different here (x(Ā + (pH − pL)/4t), instead of xĀ). These
additional x(pH − pL)/4t consumers refer to a firm’s inflated demand for L,
as we elaborated in the previous paragraph.
If pAH = pAL , infra-marginal L-consumers, and with them the associated
asymmetry, disappear. As we show next, cH = cL is a sufficient condition for
pAH = pAL in a symmetric interior equilibrium. In this case, (16) and (17) have
a simple solution, which is identical markups on H and L. This, however,
only holds for cH = cL. In a next step, we will thus “perturb” cH to examine
equilibrium markups on H and L in a more general setting where cH ≥ cL.
Lemma 2. If d ∼ i.i.d. U3[0, 1], and cH = cL, in a symmetric interior
equilibrium of the pricing game it must hold that pH = pL.
Proof. If pH < pL, nobody buys L. If pH > pL, we know from (16) that
(pH − cH)/2t < Ā. (18)
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From (17), pH > pL implies
(pL − cL)/2t > Ā+ (pH − pL)/4t. (19)
By combining (18) and (19), we have pL − cL > 2tĀ+ (pH − pL)/2 > 2tĀ >
pH − cH , a contradiction to cH = cL and pH > pL.
In words, in the case of identical costs cH = cL, it cannot be that markups
on high-quality products are higher than markups on low-quality products.
As we state in (18), if pH > pL, firms had an incentive to lower pH and inter-
nally move consumers to H, unless there were relatively many infra-marginal
consumers of H.10 Meanwhile, as we state in (19), firms had an incentive
to raise pL, unless there were relatively little infra-marginal consumers of L.
High gains on infra-marginal H-consumers and low gains on infra-marginal
L-consumers, however, cannot occur simultaneously. The former implies a
high amountH-consumers. The latter implies a high amount of L-consumers,
as here the ratio between infra-marginal and marginal consumers (marginal
with respect to B) decreases with the quantity of low-quality consumers.
Next, we show that, for the special case cH = cL, the equilibrium prices
equal the ones in Section 4.
Lemma 3. If d ∼ i.i.d. U3[0, 1], and cH = cL, the only symmetric interior
equilibrium of the pricing game is characterized by p∗H = cH + t and p∗L =
cL + t.
Proof. Note that x(p∗H , p∗L) = 0, A(p∗H , p∗L) = 1/2, and therefore (p∗H , p∗L)
solves (16) and (17). In the opposite direction, Lemma 2 requires pH −
cH = pL − cL =: M. Formulated this way, (17) reads (1/2t + 1/2tL)M =
1/2 + (1/2tL)M, implyingM = pH − cH = pL − cL = t. Later, that is, for
the general case without restricting to cH = cL, we show that there are no
unilateral deviations towards corner solutions.
The intuition behind Lemma 3 is simple: Given pH = pL, the probability
that a consumer buys H is 1. Therefore, vertical preferences do not play a
role, and the firms essentially play a standard Hotelling game, the familiar
outcome of which is p∗H = cH + t. The according profits are π(p∗H , p∗L) = t/2.
Once we drop the assumption cH = cL, matters become more difficult.
In particular, the analytic solution to (16) and (17) is generally intricate and
barely interpretable. Since Lemma 3 reveals a simple solution for cH = cL,
however, we can use “perturbation methods” (see, for instance, Judd, 1996)
10“Relatively” refers to the relation between A’s (1− x)A infra-marginal H-consumers
and the marginal gain (1−x)(pH−cH) on consumers who start buying at A if pAH decreases.
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in order to locally approximate p∗H and p∗L for cH > cL near cH = cL. In
our case, the appropriate perturbation technique consists of using Taylor’s
theorem alongside with the implicit function theorem for R2. In Appendix
A.4, we derive second-degree Taylor approximations for p∗H and p∗L which we
present in Lemma 4.
Lemma 4. If d ∼ i.i.d. U3[0, 1], and cH ≥ cL sufficiently close, the only
symmetric interior equilibrium of the pricing game is characterized by
p∗H = cH + t+O
(
(cH − cL)3
)
and
p∗L = cL + t+
(cH − cL)2
2t +O
(
(cH − cL)3
)
.
Sketch of Proof. After defining p := (pH , pL), we write (16) and (17) as
f(p) = 0 and g(p) = 0. Next, we define F(p) := (f(p), g(p)). By the
implicit function theorem, it holds that
[Fp]cH=cLp′ + [Fc]cH=cL = 0, (20)
and
[Tpp(p′)]cH=cLp′ + [Fp]cH=cLp′′ + 2[Fpc]cH=cLp′ + [Fcc]cH=cL = 0, (21)
where p′ := dp/dcH , p′′ := d2p/(dcH)2, Fp(c) is the Jacobian of F with re-
spect to p (cH), Fpc (Fcc) is the derivative of Fp (Fc) with respect to cH ,
and Tpp(p′) is a multiplicative operation of p′ and the Hessian tensor of F
with respect to p, which we explicitly formulate in Appendix A.4. Also in
Appendix A.4, we compute Fp and Fc, and solve (20) for p′. This yields
p′ = (1, 0).11 After plugging this first-order approximation into (21), and
computing Tpp(p′), Fpc, and Fcc, we obtain p′′ = (0, 1/t). By Taylor’s the-
orem, we yield the proposed second-order approximation of p. In Appendix
A.4, we also show that there are no incentives to unilaterally deviate to selling
only one product.
Lemma 4 states that, once we assume that vertical preferences are uncor-
related, markups on L are higher than on H, at least in a neighborhood of
cH = cL.12 We discussed the reason for this in the previous paragraph (see
Figure 4): In contrast to H-buyers, the consumer rent of L-buyers generally
11This first-order approximation perfectly mirrors Lemma 1 in Section 4. There, how-
ever, we have p′′ = 0, an invalid result in the case of uncorrelated vertical preferences.
12This might be different for slightly modified assumptions, as we show in the following
section.
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increases the further consumers are from Ā, the “switching line” between buy-
ing H and L. This leads to proportionally more infra-marginal L-consumers,
and acts as an incentive to narrow the gap between pAH and pAL .13
Before concluding this section, we make a remark about welfare. As in
Section 4, from a utilitarian point of view, we are only interested in the
allocation of consumers but not in prices. However, if prices were such that
both a social planner and a consumer d̄ = (d̄, d̄AL , d̄BL ) were indifferent between
d̄ buying any of the four product versions, these prices were socially optimal
regarding all other consumers as well. From identical marginal costs of A
and B, it follows that a planner chooses d̄∗ = 1/2. From (1), the planner’s
allocation further satisfies
v − d̄/2− cH = v − d̄/2− tLd̄AL − cL ⇔ d̄A∗L = (cH − cL)/tL.
On the other hand, regarding the market solution, we have seen in Lemma
4 that for the vertically indifferent consumer x it holds that
x(p∗H , p∗L) =
p∗H − p∗L
tL
' cH − cL
tL
− (cH − cL)
2
2ttL
.
Accordingly, too many consumers buy H. That is, the markup on L is not
higher for efficiency reasons, but only because, on top of horizontal competi-
tion softening, firm-specific vertical preferences additionally cushion compe-
tition.
We summarize the central findings of this section in Proposition 3, which
also rules out corner equilibria, except for cH = cL. We discuss the remaining
parts of the proof of Proposition 3 in A.5.14
Proposition 3. If d ∼ i.i.d. U3[0, 1], and cH ≥ cL, with cH and cL suffi-
ciently close, symmetric equilibria of the pricing game are characterized by
p∗H ' cH + t and p∗L ' cL + t + (cH − cL)2/2t. A’s (B’s) consumers buy H
if and only if dAL (dBL ) > (p∗H − p∗L)/tL, and otherwise buy L. Each firm’s
equilibrium profit is π(p∗H , p∗L) = t/2 at cH = cL, and locally increases in cH .
From a welfare point of view, too many consumers buy H.
13An interesting corollary to Lemma 4 is that firms generally profit from higher (!)
marginal costs on H. Only with costs (and prices) apart, the above asymmetry comes
into effect. The markup on L becomes strictly higher than t, and profits reach values
above t/2.
14The proof also includes an argument why piH − pjL ≤ t, {i, j} ∈ {A,B}, a condition
we took for granted so far. A rough intuition is as follows. With prices for H and L far
apart, firm A wishes to relocate consumers from L to H by lowering pAH , unless there is
a large amount of infra-marginal H-consumers. The latter, however, cannot be the case
with pAH − pAL > t, as in such a (putative) equilibrium most consumers prefer to buy L.
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6 Uncorrelated Vertical Preferences (II):
Markups on H May Be Higher
In the previous section, we described vertical preferences by the firm-specific
disutility a buyer receives if he or she consumes L instead of H. This implies
that, abstracting from horizontal characteristics, the high-quality product
H is perceived in exactly the same manner at the two firms. In this final
section, we suppose that the relation between H and L is in the opposed
direction. Consuming H instead of L now generates additional utility, which
we assume to be firm-specific.
To do so, we could stay with the previous utility function, and assume for
the distribution of consumers that d ∼ i.i.d. U3 [(0, 1)× (−1, 0)× (−1, 0)].
This would both alter the formulation of QAH and QAL and result in a counter-
intuitive interpretation. In particular, L would be the high-quality product,
and H would be the low-quality product, which seems somewhat odd.
For the sake of exposition, we thus modify the utility function (1) to
ui(d′) := ui(d, uAH , uBH) =
v − piH − tdi + tHuiH if qiH = 1,v − piL − tdi if qiL = 1. (22)
We remain assuming unit demand, t > 0, tH > 0, and d′ ∼ i.i.d. U3[0, 1].
Intuitively, instead of seeing L as a (firm-specific) inferior version of H, we
interpret the difference between H and L as a firm-specific “add-on” in the
sense of Verboven (1999) and Ellison (2005).
Apart from that, our analysis remains the same as in Section 5. For this
reason, we do not repeate the above arguments one by one but focus on the
fundamental intuition behind the analysis.
From (22), we specify A’s demand for H as
QAH =
∫ 1
0
(∫ 1
xA
(∫ min{HH,HL}
0
dd
)
duAH
)
duBH ,
and A’s demand for L as
QAL =
∫ 1
0
(∫ xA
0
(∫ min{LH,LL}
0
dd
)
duAH
)
duBH .
Except re-labeling (writing uAH and uBH instead of dAL and dBL ), QAH and QAL
are the same as in (8) and (9). What differs, however, are the expressions
for HH, HL, LH, and LL. Recall that we defined XAXB as the value
of d such that a consumer is indifferent between buying XA at A and XB
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at B. As we see in Figure 5, it is now min{LH,LL} which is constant in
uAH , whereas min{HH,HL} increases in uAH . This asymmetry results in an
inflated amount of infra-marginal H-consumers, and we expect p∗H − cH to
exceed p∗L − cL.
d
uAH
uBH
xA = p
A
H −pAL
tL
1
2 −
tL−pBH +pAL
2t
1
2 +
pBL −pAL
2t
1
2 +
tL−pAH +pBL
2t
xB = p
B
H −pBL
tL
tL
2t
tL
2t
Ā
Figure 5: Consumers who buy A’s high-quality product, QAH , are displayed
in the upper region, where uAH > xA. Consumers who buy A’s low-quality
product, QAL , are displayed in the lower region, where uAH ≤ xA.
Indeed, by approximating equilibrium prices around cH = cL +tH15 in the
same fashion as we did in the previous section, for cH ≤ cL + tH , we obtain
p∗H = cH + t+
(cH − cL − tH)2
2t +O
(
cH − cL − tH)3
)
and
p∗L = cL + t+O
(
(cH − cL − tH)3
)
.
Hence, markups are higher for H, and too many consumers buy L, as com-
pared to what would socially be efficient.
15We need to approximate around cH = cL + tL instead of cH = cL in order to avoid
non-continuities at cH = cL. At cH = cL + tH , we obtain QAH = 0, which is analogous to
QAL = 0 at cH = cL in Section 5. In both instances, departing from this limiting cases, the
first- and second-order effects come just into effect, and we can compare the results.
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After checking for unilateral deviations and considering putative corner
equilibria, we can state Proposition 4, which is analogous to Proposition 3
in Section 5.
Proposition 4. If the consumers’ utility function is given by (22), d′ ∼
i.i.d. U3[0, 1], and cH ≤ cL + tH , with cH and cL + tH sufficiently close,
symmetric equilibria of the pricing game are characterized by p∗H ' cH + t+
(cH−cL− tH)2/2t and p∗L ' cL + t. A’s (B’s) consumers buy H if and only if
uAH (uBH) > (p∗H−p∗L)/tL, and otherwise buy L. Each firm’s equilibrium profit
is π(p∗H , p∗L) = t/2 at cH = cL + tH , and locally increases for a decreasing cH .
From a welfare point of view, too many consumers buy L.
7 Conclusion
General models of horizontal and vertical market segmentation find that, in
oligopolistic contexts, markups do not vary with quality.
We qualify this somewhat counterintuitive result by relaxing the assump-
tion that vertical preferences are perfectly harmonious across firms: a high
reduction in utility from consuming the low-quality product instead of the
high-quality product at one firm not necessarily implies the same at the
firm’s competitor. In such a setting, we find that markups on low-quality
products exceed markups on high-quality products in a symmetric interior
equilibrium. To the contrary, if low-quality products are only distinguished
by their horizontal characteristics, and supplementary utility from consuming
a high-quality product is specific to the firm, we obtain the opposite result.
From a welfare perspective of view, we want horizontal competition to be
weak. Although this softens competition, the lack of horizontal competitive-
ness does not affect horizontal allocative efficiency.16 In addition, if firms are
horizontal substitutes, they differentiate their customers vertically. A social
planner wants to prevent this. Hence, regarding horizontal differentiation,
the firms’ objective is perfectly in line with the objective of the planner. On
the other hand, regarding vertical preferences, the objectives of firms and
planner are diametrically opposed. If the prices of low-quality products are
distorted, we want the marginal valuation of quality to be high, such that
more consumers buy the high-quality product. If the prices of high-quality
products are distorted, we want the marginal valuation of quality to be low,
such that more consumers buy the low-quality product. On the other hand,
as we have seen, firms’ profits unanimously increase in the extent of price
distortions.
16This, of course, crucially depends on our assumption of fully covered markets.
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In order to test our opposed results of Sections 5 and 6, we could ask
for which species of products it is the high-quality version for which the
differentiation is specific to the firm, and when it is the low-quality version.
According to our theory, it is firm-specific differentiation which opens the
door for higher markups.
An interesting theoretical exercise would be to endogenize the firms’
choice of the type and degree of differentiation. This, however, brings along
intricacies regarding asymmetric departure points in the second stage. As
often in the field, simulations could be a viable backdoor strategy.
Finally, our theory could be improved by allowing consumers to buy mul-
tiple (or zero) units; by allowing firms to sell more than two product versions;
by considering asymmetric equilibria; or by including the entry decision of
(additional) firms. These and related considerations indicate that the scope
for augmenting and adjusting our model is almost unlimited.
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Appendix
A.1 First-order Conditions
The FOC with respect to pAH is
∂πA
∂pAH
=
∫ 1
0
−∫ 1
xA
1
2tf
(
min{HH,HL}, dAL , dBL
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:mH
ddAL
− 1
tL

∫ min{HH(dAL =xA),HL(dAL =xA)}
0
f(d, xA, dBL )dd︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:AH (dA
L
=xA)

ddBL (pAH − cH)
+
∫ 1
0

∫ 1
xA

∫ min{HH,HL}
0
f(d, dAL , dBL )dd︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:AH
ddAL
 ddBL
+
∫ 1
0
 1tL
∫ min{LH(dAL =xA),LL(dAL =xA)}
0
f(d, xA, dBL )dd︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:AL(dA
L
=xA)
 ddBL (pAL − cL) != 0,
(A.1)
with
HH := 12 +
pBH − pAH
2t ,
HL := 12 +
pBL − pAH
2t +
tL
2t d
B
L ,
LH := 12 +
pBH − pAL
2t −
tL
2t d
A
L ,
LL := 12 +
pBL − pAL
2t +
tL
2t (d
B
L − dAL).
In a symmetric equilibrium with pAL = pBL =: pL, pAH = pBH =: pH (and thus xA = xB =: x),
it holds that
min{HH,HL} =
{
HH = 1/2 if dBL ∈ (x, 1]
HL = (1/2t)(t+ pL − pH + tLdBL ) if dBL ∈ [0, x],
(A.2)
and
min{LH,LL} =
{
LH = (1/2t)(t+ pH − pL − tLdiL ) if dBL ∈ (x, 1]
LL = (1/2t)(t+ tL(dBL − dAL)) if dBL ∈ [0, x].
(A.3)
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Therefore, and from evaluating (A.2) and (A.3) at dAL = x, we have
AH(dAL = x|dBL > x) = AL(dAL = x|dBL > x) =
∫ 1/2
0
f(d, x, dBL )dd,
since
AH(dAL = x) =
∫ HH(dAL =x)
0
f(d, x, dBL )dd =
∫ 1/2
0
f(d, x, dBL )dd,
and
AL(dAL = x) =
∫ LH(dAL =x)
0
f(d, x, dBL )dd =
∫ 1/2
0
f(d, x, dBL )dd.
Analogically, for dB ≤ x, we obtain
AH(dAL = x|dAL ≤ x) = AL(dAL = x|dAL ≤ x) =
∫ 1
2 +
pL−pH
2t +
tL
2t d
B
L
0
f(d, x, dBL )dd.
Consequently, we can simplify the FOC (A.1) to(∫ 1
0
∫ 1
x
mHddALddBL +
∫ 1
0
AH(dAL = x)
tL
ddBL
)
(pH − cH)
=
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
x
AHddALddBL︸ ︷︷ ︸
=QA
H
+
∫ 1
0
AH(dAL = x)
tL
ddBL (pL − cL) (A.4)
The FOC with respect to pAL is
∂πA
∂pAL
=
∫ 1
0
−∫ xA
0
1
2tf
(
min{LH,LL}, dAL , dBL
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:mL
ddAL
− 1
tL

∫ min{LH(dAL =xA),LL(dAL =xA)}
0
f(d, xA, dBL )dd︸ ︷︷ ︸
=AL(dA
L
=xA)

ddBL (pAL − cL)
+
∫ 1
0

∫ xA
0

∫ min{LH,LL}
0
f(d, dAL , dBL )dd︸ ︷︷ ︸
=AL
ddAL
 ddBL
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+
∫ 1
0
 1tL
∫ min{HH(dAL =xA),HL(dAL =xA)}
0
f(d, xA, dBL )dd︸ ︷︷ ︸
=AH (dA
L
=xA)
ddBL (pAH − cH) != 0.
(A.5)
For the version of (A.5) which applies in a symmetric interior equilibrium, we use AL(dAL =
x) = AH(dAL = x) from above. Accordingly, we have(∫ 1
0
∫ x
0
mLddALddBL +
∫ 1
0
AL(dAL = x)
tL
ddBL
)
(pL − cL)
=
∫ 1
0
∫ x
0
ALddALddBL︸ ︷︷ ︸
=QA
L
+
∫ 1
0
AL(dAL = x)
tL
ddBL (pH − cH). (A.6)
A.2 Proof of Lemma 1 (Completion)
In absence of corner solutions, the proof is given in the main body of the text. Alter-
natively, firm A may only sell either H or L. By only selling H, A’s objective function
is
πA =
∫ 1
0
min
{
1
2 +
pBH − pAH
2t ,
1
2 +
pBL − pAH
2t +
tL
2t dL
}
ddL(pAH − cH),
the FOC of which is
pAH − cH =
∫ 1
0
min
{
t+ pBH − pAH , t+ pBL − pAH + tLdL
}
ddL.
After plugging in pBH = cH + t and pBL = cL + t, we obtain p̃AH = cH + t− (cH − cL)2/4tL.
A’s markup on H thus is smaller than or equal to t. As A’s equilibrium profit is t/2, it
remains to be shown QAH(p̃AH) ≤ 1/2. Formally,
QAH(p̃AH) =
∫ 1
cH −cL
tL
1
2 +
(cH + t)−
(
cH + t− (cH − cL)2/4tL
)
2t ddL
+
∫ cH −cL
tL
0
1
2 +
(cL + t)−
(
cH + t− (cH − cL)2/4tL
)
2t +
tL
2t dLddL ≤
1
2 ,
from the definition of QAH . This holds for all cH and cL, because
⇔ (cH − cL)
2
4tL
+
∫ cH −cL
tL
0
tLdLddL ≤
∫ cH −cL
tL
0
cH − cLddL
⇔ (cH − cL)
2
4tL
+ (cH − cL)
2
2tL
≤ (cH − cL)
2
tL
.
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By only selling L, A’s objective function is
πA =
∫ 1
0
min
{
1
2 +
pBH − pAL
2t −
tL
2t dL,
1
2 +
pBL − pAL
2t
}
ddL(pAL − cL).
From the associated FOC, we obtain p̃AL = cL + t − (tL − cH + cL)2/4tL. Again, it is
sufficient to show that QAL(p̃AL) ≤ 1/2. Formally,
QAL(p̃AH) =
∫ 1
cH −cL
tL
1
2 +
(cH + t)−
(
cL + t− (tL − cH + cL)2/4tL
)
2t −
tL
2t dLddL
+
∫ cH −cL
tL
0
1
2 +
(cL + t)−
(
cL + t− (tL − cH + cL)2/4tL
)
2t ddL ≤
1
2 ,
from the definition of QAL . This holds for all considered values of cH and cL, because
⇔ (tL − cH + cL)
2
4tL
+
∫ 1
cH −cL
tL
(cH − cL)ddL ≤
∫ 1
cH −cL
tL
tLdLddL
⇔ tL − cH + cL4 + (cH − cL) ≤
tL
2
(
1 + cH − cL
tL
)
⇔ cH − cL ≤ tL,
which is true by assumption.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2 (Completion)
From Lemma 1 and condition (4), it follows that symmetric interior equilibria exist if and
only if 0 ≤ cH − cL < tL, and that they are characterized by p∗H = cH + t and p∗L = cL + t.
Regarding symmetric corner equilibria, first assume that both firms only sell H. In
this case, firm A maximizes
πA =
(
1
2 +
pBH − pAH
2t
)
(pAH − cH), (A.7)
with respect to pAH , as in the standard Hotelling case. The (symmetric) solution of (A.7)
is pA∗H = cH + t, and A’s profit is πA
∗ = t/2. Whenever A finds a price p̃AL such that
its total demand increases without decreasing the markup on either of its products, only
selling H cannot be an equilibrium. From (2), A steals customers from B by offering L if
and only if
v − (p̃AL + tL × 0)− t/2 > v − (cH + t)− t/2 ⇔ p̃AL < cH + t. (A.8)
Meanwhile, A’s markup on either product is not lowered if and only if
p̃AL − cL ≥ pAH − cH = t ⇔ pAL ≥ cL + t. (A.9)
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(A.8) and (A.9) are simultaneously feasible if and only if
cL + t < cH + t ⇔ cL < cH .
For cH = cL, check that p̃AH = cH + t and p̃AL = cL + t solve (14) and (15) for pBH = cH + t
and pBL =∞. The resulting profit is πA(p̃AH , p̃AL) = t/2, hence there is no incentive to offer
both H and L in this case.
If both firms only sell L, A objective function is also the one of a standard Hotelling
game, because dAL = dBL = dL. Therefore, pA
∗
L = cL + t, and πA
∗ = 1/2. In this case,
the equivalents to (A.9) and (A.8) yield that A has an incentive to offer H if and only if
cH − cL < tL. For cH = cL + tL, p̃AH = cH + t and p̃AL = cL + t solve (A.4) and (A.6) for
pBH =∞ and pBL = cL + t. Again, the resulting profit is πA(p̃AH , p̃AL) = 1/2, and there is no
incentive to offer both H and L.
A.4 Proof of Lemma 4 (Completion)
We write (16) and (17) as
f̃(p) := Ā
tL
(pH − cH − pL + cL − tL(1− x)) +
1− x
2t (pH − cH) = 0,
and
g̃(p) := Ā
tL
(pL − cL − pH + cH − tLx) +
x
2t
(
pL − cL −
pH − pL
2
)
= 0.
In the following, we use f(p) = 2tf(p) = 0 and g(p) = 2tg(p) = 0, which simplifies
fractions, as we see later on. Furthermore, by using Ā = 1/2 − (tL/4t)x2 and x =
(pH − pL)/tL, we write f(p) = 0 and g(p) = 0 as
2tLf(p) :=
(
2ttL − (pH − pL)2
)
(2(pH − pL)− cH + cL − tL)
+ 2tL(tL − pH + pL)(pH − cH) = 0, (A.10)
and
2tLg(p) :=
(
2ttL − (pH − pL)2
)
(2(pL − pH) + cH − cL)
+ 2tL(pH − pL)(pL − cL)− tL(pH − pL)2 = 0. (A.11)
The partial derivatives of (A.10) and (A.11) with respect to pH , pL, and cH are
2tL
∂f(p)
∂pH
=− 2(pH − pL) (2(pH − pL)− cH + cL − tL)
+
(
2ttL − (pH − pL)2
)
2− 2tL (2pH − pL − cH − tL) , (A.12)
2tL
∂f(p)
∂pL
= 2(pH − pL) (2(pH − pL)− cH + cL − tL)
−
(
2ttL − (pH − pL)2
)
2 + 2tL (pH − cH) , (A.13)
2tL
∂f(p)
∂cH
=− 2ttL + (pH − pL)2 − 2tL (tL − pH + pL) , (A.14)
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2tL
∂g(p)
∂pH
=− 2(pH − pL) (2(pL − pH) + cH − cL)
−
(
2ttL − (pH − pL)2
)
2 + 2tL(2pL − pH − cL), (A.15)
2tL
∂g(p)
∂pL
= 2(pH − pL) (2(pL − pH) + cH − cL)
+
(
2ttL − (pH − pL)2
)
2− 2tL (3pL − 2pH − cL) . (A.16)
2tL
∂g(p)
∂cH
= 2ttL − (pH − pL)2. (A.17)
After substituting pH = cH + t and pL = cL + t into (A.12) through (A.17), we write (20)
as (
t+ tL −t
−t t
)(
p′H
p′L
)
+
(
−(t+ tL)
t
)
= 0,
the solution of which is (p′H , p′L) = (1, 0). After taking the derivatives of (A.12) through
(A.17) with respect to pH , pL, and cH , and after plugging in pH = cH + t and pL = cL + t
once more, we use (p′H , p′L) = (1, 0) in order to write (21) as
[Tpp(p′)]cH =cLp′ +
(
t+ tL −t
−t t
)(
p′′H
p′′L
)
+ 2
(
1 −1
0 0
)(
1
0
)
= 0. (A.18)
Further, we write [Tpp(p′)]cH =cLp′ as Fpp(1)vec(p′p′T ), where Fpp(1) is the 1-mode flat-
tening matrix of the Hessian tensor of F with respect to p. That is,
[Tpp(p′)]cH =cLp′ =
(
fHH fHL fLH fLL
gHH gHL gLH gLL
)
1
0
0
0
 = (fHHgHH
)
,
where fij :=
[
∂2f(·)/∂pi∂pj
]
cH =cL
and gij :=
[
∂2g(·)/∂pi∂pj
]
cH =cL
. From (A.12) and
(A.15), we have fHH = gHH = −1, and we write (A.18) as(
t+ tL −t
−t t
)(
p′′H
p′′L
)
=
(
−1
1
)
,
the solution of which is (p′′H , p′′L) = (0, 1/t).
Alternatively, firm A may only sell either H or L. In order to analyze such unilateral
deviations for the general case cH ≥ cL, it is useful to first show that the objective function
is concave at cH = cL. From (A.1) and (A.5) with f(d) ≡ 1, and from the fact that the
πA(pAH , pAL) is twice differentiable, it follows that[
∂2πA
(∂pAH)2
]
cH =cL
= −1
t
− 12tL
,
[
∂2πA
(∂pAL)2
]
cH =cL
= − 12tL
,
and [
∂2πA
∂pAH∂p
A
L
]
cH =cL
=
[
∂2πA
∂pAL∂p
A
H
]
cH =cL
= 12tL
.
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πA is locally strictly concave at cH = cL if the Hessian matrix H of its second derivatives
is negative definite. This is the case here, since the leading principal minors of
−H =
( 1
t +
1
2tL −
1
2tL
− 12tL
1
2tL
)
are 1/t+ 1/2tL and 1/2ttL, that is, positive.
Next, for the case that cH = cL, consider firm A’s deviation to only selling H. In this
case, its objective function is
π̃A =
∫ 1
0
min
{
1
2 +
pBH − pAH
2t ,
1
2 +
pBL − pAH
2t +
tL
2t d
B
L
}
ddBL .
We state the according FOC with respect to pAH as
∂π̃A
∂pAH
=
∫ 1
0
min
{
t+ pBH − pAH , t+ pBL − pAH + tLdBL
}︸ ︷︷ ︸
t+pB
H
−pA
H
≤t+pB
L
−pA
H
+tLdBL ⇔ dBL≥(pBH−pBL )/tL
ddBL − (pAH − cH)
!= 0.
Using pBH = cH + t and pBL = cL + t, this is
∫ cH −cL
tL
0
(t+ cL + t− pAH + tLdBL )ddBL
+
∫ 1
cH −cL
tL
(t+ cH + t− pAH)ddBL = pAA − cH .
From cH = cL, the first term cancels out, which implies p̃AH = cH + t. Since L is bought
with probability 0 at cH = cL, we have πA(p̃AH ,∞) = t/2, and there is no incentive
to unilaterally deviate. Furthermore, at cH = cL, we can equivalently set (p̃AH , p̃AL) to
(cH + t, cL + t) , since there the “no-selling constraint” with respect to L is not binding.
From strict concavity and continuity of πA at cH = cL, we know that the prices in Lemma
4 are uniquely best answers for cH > cL sufficiently close. This makes the no-selling
constraint concerning (p̃AH , p̃AL) binding, which proves that deviating to only selling H is
unilaterally not beneficial.
Next, consider firm A’s deviation to only selling L. Here, the objective function is
π̃A =
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
min
{
1
2 +
pBH − pAL
2t −
tL
2t d
A
L ,
1
2 +
pBL − pAL
2t +
tL
2t (d
B
L − dAL)
}
ddALddBL (pAL − cL). (A.19)
For cH = cL, we write the according FOC with respect to pAL as∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
(t+ pBH − pAL − tLdAL)ddALddBL
!= pAL − cL,
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which implies p̃AL = cL + t − tL/4. By plugging p̃AL , pBH = cH + t, and pBL = cL + t into
(A.19), and by imposing cH = cL, we yield
πA(∞, p̃AL) =
(
1
2 −
tL
8t
)(
t− tL4
)
<
1
2 t = π
A(p∗H , p∗L).
Since both (p∗H , p∗L) and p̃AL are continuous functions in cH and cL, unilaterally deviating
to only selling L is also not beneficial in the case of cH > cL with cH and cL sufficiently
close.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 3 (Completion)
First, assume that both firms only sell H. In this case, they play a standard Hotelling
game, the solution of which is p∗H = cH + t and πA(p∗H) = t/2. Consider A’s potential
deviation to selling both products. The according FOCs are given by (A.1) and (A.5) with
pBL =∞. By simplifying these we yield (16) and (17), with Ā := 1/2 + (pBH − pAH)2t. For
cH = cL, the according solution is p̃AH = cH +t and p̃AL = cL +t. The resulting allocation of
consumers is the same as in the standard Hotelling case, and πA(p̃AH , p̃AL) = t/2. Therefore,
both firms only offering H is another equilibrium if cH = cL. If cH > cL, we apply the
same approximation method as in the proof of Lemma 4. We obtain
p̃AH = cH + t+
(cH − cL)2
4tL
+O
(
(cH − cL)3
)
and
p̃AL = cL + t+
(
1
t
+ 12tL
)
(cH − cL)2
2 +O
(
(cH − cL)3
)
.
Since p̃AH−p̃AL > 0, firm A seeks to sell L, which in turn eliminates the putative equilibrium.
Consider the opposite case where both firms only sell L. Then, A’s objective function
is
πA =
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
(
1
2 +
pBL − pAL
2t
)
ddALddBL (pAL − cL).
From the associated FOC, and after imposing symmetry, we obtain p∗L = cL + t and
πA(p∗L) = t/2. In this case, A can increase its profit by only selling H at p̃AH = cL + t.
By doing so, A covers the whole market, and its profit is πA(p̃AH) = t − (cH − cL). Since
πA(p̃AH) > πA(p∗L) if and only if t/2 > cH − cL, firm A prefers to sell H if cH ≥ cL are
sufficiently close. This eliminates the second putative equilibrium.
So far, we assumed that piH − pjL ≤ t, {i, j} ∈ {A,B}. Suppose now, to the opposite,
that pAH − pAL > t. From (4), there is is no interior equilibrium if t > tL. Therefore,
it remains for us to demonstrate that t < p∗H − p∗L ≤ tL cannot be an equilibrium.
From pAH − pBL > t it follows that (8) and (9) no longer represent QAH and QAL , since
min{HH,HL} and min{LH,LL} lie outside [0, 1] for some combinations of dAL ∈ [0, 1]
and dBL ∈ [0, 1]. This is illustrated in Figure 6. Therefore, FOCs (16) and (17) need to be
adjusted accordingly. The adapted analogue of (16) is(
F̄
2t +
Ā
tL
)
(pH − cH) = F̄ Ā+
Ā
tL
(pL − cL), (A.20)
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d
dAL
dBL
1
2 +
pBL −pAL
2t
xB = (pBH − p
B
L )/tL
(pAH − p
B
L − t)/tL
(t + pAL − p
B
L )/tL
xA = p
A
H −pAL
tL
pBH −pAL −t
tL
t+pBL −pAL
tL
1
2 +
pAH −pBH
2t
tL
2t
tL
2t
Ā
F̄
Figure 6: Consumers who buy A’s high-quality product, QAH , are displayed in the upper
region, where dAL > xA. Consumers who buy A’s low-quality product, QAL , are displayed
in the lower region, where dAL ≤ xA.
where
Ā := 12tL
(
tL − pH + pL +
t
2
)
represents the frontier between consumers of H and consumers of L at A, and
F̄ :=
(
1− pH − pL − t
tL
)(
1− pH − pL
tL
)
represents the “inter-firm” marginal consumers (see Figure 6). For cH ≥ cL with cH and
cL sufficiently close, (A.20) is necessarily violated if
Ā
tL
(pH − pL) > F̄ Ā−
F̄
2t (pH − cH). (A.21)
From pH−pL ≤ tL, we have Ā/tL ≥ t/4t2L; and from pH−pL > t, we have F̄ < (tL−t)/tL.
Using (A.21), it is thus sufficient to show that
t
4t2L
× t > tL − t
tL
(
Ā− pH − cH2t
)
(A.22)
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Also from pH − pL > t, we have pH − cH > t + pL − cH . For cH sufficiently close to cL,
this implies pH − cH > t, since pL ≥ cL in any interior equilibrium. Further, pH − pL > t
implies that Ā < (1/2tL)(tL − t/2) = 1/2 − t/4tL. Using (A.22), it consequently suffices
to show that (
t
2tL
)2
>
tL − t
tL
(
1
2 −
t
4tL
− 12
)
(A.23)
Since the left-hand side of (A.23) is positive, and the right-hand side of (A.23) is negative,
we have eliminated the third putative equilibrium.
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